1995-VIL-375-BOM-DT

Equivalent Citation: [1996] 221 ITR 77, 135 CTR 163, 89 TAXMANN 353

BOMBAY HIGH COURT

Date: 21.12.1995

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX

Vs

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

BENCH

Judge(s)  : DR. B. P. SARAF., M. L. DUDHAT 

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the court was delivered by

DR. B. P. SARAF J.--By this reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, made at the instance of the Revenue, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench, Bombay, has referred the following question of law to this court for opinion :

" Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the Oxford University Press, Bombay, which is part of the Oxford University, is exempt under section 10(22) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? "

The assessee is the Oxford University Press, Bombay ("the Press"). This reference pertains to the assessment year 1976-77. The assessee filed its return under the Income-tax Act, 1961 ("the Act"), for the said assessment year showing an income of Rs. 19.94 lakhs. As in the past, the above return was signed by the general manager of the Indian branch of the assessee-press. It was, however, later revised and a fresh return signed by the "Delegate and Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Oxford University Press" was filed. In the past, at the assessee's own request, it had been assessed to income-tax in respect of its income in the status of a company as per the notification issued by the Central Board of Revenue. However, in the course of the hearing for assessment before the Income-tax Officer, for the above assessment year the authorised representative of the assessee-press claimed that the press was a branch of the Oxford University and hence its income would be exempt from income-tax by virtue of section 10(22) of the Act. The Income-tax Officer rejected the above contention. While doing so, the Income-tax Officer took note of the fact that the assessee was being assessed to income-tax under the Income-tax Act right from the assessment year 1952-53 as a company. He also noted the submission made on behalf of the assessee, the Oxford University Press, that it was a branch of the Oxford University, London, constituted under a charter of the British Government and that there was a stipulation in its constitution that the earnings from its activities would be used wholly and solely for educational purposes. The Income-tax Officer, however, found that the assessee-press was not only distributing the books published by it but it was also carrying on the business of selling books of other publishers, e.g., Faber and Faber Ltd., George G. Harrap and Co. Ltd., and Ginn and Co. Ltd. This was evident from the catalogue of the books sold by it. He, therefore, held that the assessee was not entitled to exemption under section 10(22) of the Act. Against the above order of the Income-tax Officer, the assessee appealed to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Before the Commissioner (Appeals), the claim for exemption under section 10(22) was reiterated by the assessee mainly on the ground that though the assessee was a press and acted as such in India, being a part of the Oxford University, it was a University for the purposes of exemption of its income under section 10(22) of the Act. This contention of the assessee found favour with the Commissioner (Appeals). He held that the assessee-press was a part of the Oxford University and hence entitled to exemption in respect of its income under section 10(22) of the Act. The Commissioner (Appeals), therefore, held that the income of the assessee-press in the year under consideration was exempt under section 10(22) of the Act and it was not liable to pay any income-tax in respect thereof. He did not attribute any relevance to the fact that in the past the assessee had itself offered its income from the business of printing, publishing and selling books in India to be assessed in the status of a company. According to the Commissioner (Appeals), it was not a material consideration in deciding the question whether the assessee-press, known as the "Oxford University Press", could be treated as a University for the purpose of exemption of its income under clause (22) of section 10 of the Act.

Aggrieved by the above order of the Commissioner (Appeals), the Revenue appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal ("the Tribunal"). On behalf of the Revenue, it was contended before the Tribunal, inter alia, that the assessee-press was not a University within the meaning of section 10(22) of the Act. The Tribunal did not accept the above contention of the Revenue and held that the assessee "Oxford University Press" was a part of the Oxford University and hence it had to be regarded as a University. In this connection, the Tribunal referred to the provisions of section 10(22) of the Act and observed that the exemption granted thereunder in respect of the income of a University or other educational institution was subject only to the condition that such University or educational institution existed solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit. The Tribunal observed that the above two conditions were fulfilled in the case of the assessee-press be cause it was a part of the Oxford University which existed solely for the purpose of education and not for purposes of profits. According to the Tribunal, the fact that the assessee was printing and publishing books in India and/or making considerable money as profit by selling books, was not relevant for the purpose of deciding the claim of the assessee for exemption under section 10(22) of the Act. The Tribunal also turned down the submission of the Revenue that the University referred to in section 10(22) of the Act must be an Indian University on the ground that section 10(22) did not contain any such restriction. In view of its above opinion, the Tribunal held that the assessee, Oxford University Press, was entitled to exemption under section 10(22) of the Act in respect of. its income from the business of publishing and selling books in India. Hence, this reference at the instance of the Revenue.

Mr. T. U. Khatri, learned counsel for the Revenue, submits that the assessee, Oxford University Press, is neither a "University" nor an "educational institution" within the meaning of section 10(22) of the Act. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Khatri to the fact that the assessee in this case is the "Oxford University Press" and not the Oxford University. It was pointed out that the assessee-press cannot, by any stretch of imagination, justifiably claim itself to be a University for the purposes of section 10(22) of the Act. It was submitted by learned counsel that if the assessee-press claims itself to be Oxford University, as a part of it, in that event, the assessee should have been the "Oxford University" and not the "Oxford University Press". According to learned counsel, even if the assessee-press is a part of the Oxford University, it being engaged in carrying on the business of printing, publishing and selling books and in no other activity, its income from such business cannot be regarded as the income of a University existing in India within the meaning of section 10(22) of the Act. In other words, the submission of learned counsel is that, in any event, in order to get exemption under section 10(22), the assessee has to establish that the income claimed to be exempt from income-tax bears the character of the income of a University which the assessee has miserably failed to do in the instant case. Counsel for the Revenue further submits that the Oxford University does not exist in India as a University solely for educational purposes. What is existing in India is the Oxford University Press which, even if held to be a part of the said University, cannot be regarded as a University or an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit and hence its income cannot qualify for exemption under section 10(22) of the Act. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Sorabji Nusserwanji Parekh [1993] 201 ITR 939 and the decision of the Supreme Court in Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust v. CIT [1975] 101 ITR 234.

In reply, Mr. Soli Dastur, learned counsel for the assessee, submits that the fact that the assessee, "Oxford University Press", is a part of the Oxford University cannot be disputed by the Revenue in this reference at this stage in view of the categorical finding of the Tribunal to that effect. Mr. Dastur further submits that section 10(22) does not envisage the existence of a University or an educational institution in India. According to him, even if a University or an educational institution exists outside India, any income of such University or educational institution from any source in India will be exempt under section 10(22) of the Act. The source of income, according to learned counsel for the assessee, is immaterial for deciding the claim for exemption under section 10(22) of the Act. What is material, according to him, is the description of the assessee. Counsel submits that once the assessee falls within the description of a person specified in section 10(22) of the Act, all income derived by it from any source or any activity would be exempt from tax. Reliance is placed in support of this submission on the decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Rangaraya Medical College (Governing Body of) v. ITO [ 1979] 117 ITR 284, the Karnataka High Court in CIT v. Academy of General Education [1984] 150 ITR 135, the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat State Co-operative Union v. CIT [1992] 195 ITR 279, the Kerala High Court in CIT v. Sree Narayana Chandrika Trust [1995] 212 ITR 456 and the Orissa High Court in Secondary Board of Education v. ITO [1972] 86 ITR 408.

We have carefully considered the rival submissions of learned counsel of both the parties. The controversy in this case is in a narrow compass and the determination thereof depends upon the true and correct interpretation of section 10(22) of the Act. Admittedly, the assessee before us is the "Oxford University Press" and not the "Oxford University". There is, however, a finding of the Tribunal to the effect that the assessee-press is a part of the Oxford University. The income which is the subject-matter of controversy in this case is the income of the assessee-press in India derived from printing and publishing books and selling the same as well as books of other publishers. The bone of contention of the assessee is that the assessee, being a part of the Oxford University has to be regarded as a University and, in that view of the matter, its income would be exempt under section 10(22) of the Act. The case of the Revenue, on the other hand, is that the assessee is not a University within the meaning of section 10(22) of the Act and hence its income cannot be regarded as the income of a University which is exempt from income-tax under section 10(22) of the Act.

Section 10 of the Act specifies various incomes which are not included in the total income of a person. We are concerned in this case with the income specified in clause (22) thereof. Section 10 of the Act, so far as relevant for determination of the controversy in this case, reads :

"10. Incomes not included in total income.--In computing the total income of a previous year of any person, any income falling within any of the following clauses shall not be included-- .....

(22) any income of a University or other educational institution, existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit. . . ."

Section 10(22) thus provides that in computing the income of a previous year of any person, any income of a University or other educational institution, shall not be included, if such University or educational institution exists solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit. It is clear from the above provision that for exemption under this provision, it is not necessary that the assessee itself should be a University or an educational institution. The character of the assessee is not material. He may be "any person" including a person engaged in business or profession. Even then, he would be entitled to exemption under section 10(22) of the Act in respect of any income falling within clause (22) of section 10 of the Act. In other words, what is exempt is "the income of a University or an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for the purpose of profit". It is not necessary for the purpose of section 10(22) that the University or educational institution itself is an assessee. Nor that such University or educational institution be established or constituted in India. What is necessary for availing of the benefit of exemption under section 10(22) of the Act is that the income is the income of University or an, educational institution "existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit". The expression " existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit" appearing in section 10(22) of the Act is thus a condition precedent for exemption under section 10(22) of the Act. In the context and setting of this clause, the expression "existing" obviously means and refers to the existence of such University or institution solely for educational purposes in India. If a University or an educational institution, though existing outside India as a University or an educational institution for educational purposes, does not so exist in India, it would not be entitled to claim exemption of its income from other activity carried on by it in India by virtue of section 10(22) of the Act. In other words, a University or an educational institution, whether established in India or abroad, must retain its character of a University or an educational institution in India and the income in respect of which exemption is claimed under section 10(22) of the Act must be the income derived by it in its capacity as a University or an educational institution. If it does not carry on its activities as a University or educational institution in India, it cannot be regarded as a University or educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and hence the income derived by it from any other activities would not qualify for exemption under section 10(22) of the Act.

We may now examine the claim of the assessee in the instant case for exemption of its income under section 10(22) of the Act in the light of the legal position set out above. Admittedly, the assessee is the Oxford University Press and 'not the Oxford University. The Oxford University does not exist in India nor does it carry on any of the activities of a University in India. What exists in India is the Oxford University Press. The only activity carried on by the press, which is the assessee in this case, in India is the activity of printing and publishing books and selling the same as well as publications of other publishers and to earn profit. This activity, in effect, tantamounts to carrying on the business of selling or supplying books for profit. On its own showing, even in the year under consideration the assessee-press made a net profit of about Rs. 20 lakhs. Such income cannot be regarded as income of a University existing solely for educational purposes merely because the assessee-press claims to be a part of the Oxford University which does not exist at all in India--not to speak of solely for educational purposes. If the Oxford University had existed in India solely for educational purposes, the position would have been different and it might have been possible for it at least to contend that the income of the assessee-press is ancillary to its activities as a University and hence it should be regarded as the income of the Oxford University. But when the Oxford University itself does not exist in India, the income of the press in India cannot be held to be the income of a University for the purposes of section 10(22) of the Act merely because the press is held to be a part of the University.

We have also taken note of the fact that the assessee in the instant case had given an undertaking before the Income-tax Officer that 60 per cent. of its income would be applied for educational purposes in India and the balance only will be remitted to the United Kingdom. Such undertaking, in our view, does not in any way advance the case of the assessee for exemption under section 10(22) of the Act. On the other hand, in our opinion, it clearly goes to show that even the assessee-press does not exist solely for educational purposes but exists merely for purposes of profit. Obviously, the benefit of exemption under section 10(22) of the Act would not be available in such a case.

Our attention was also drawn by learned counsel for the assessee to the provisions of clauses (20A) and (23) of section 10 of the Act to show that wherever the Legislature intended to restrict the exemption to the income of any authority or institution constituted in India or established in India, it has specifically said so. We have perused the above clauses. Clause (20A) refers to the income of an authority constituted in India by or under any law enacted either for the purpose of dealing with and satisfying the need for housing accommodation or for the purpose of planning, development or improvement of cities, towns, villages, etc. Clause (23) exempts the income of an association or institution established in India having as its object the control, supervision, regulation or encouragement in India of the games of cricket, hockey, football, etc., provided it fulfils the conditions specified therein. These two clauses, in our opini on, do not assist the assessee in any way. On the other hand, on a comparison of the language used in these two clauses with that of clause (22), it becomes abundantly clear that to get the exemption of its income from income-tax under the Act the University or educational institution must "exist solely for educational purposes".

Though we are in agreement with the contention of learned counsel for the assessee that in order to be eligible to exemption under section 10(22) of the Act it is not necessary that the University or the educational institution should be constituted in India or established in India or under the laws of India, we find it difficult to accept his contention that in the instant case, the income of the assessee-press in India would be exempt merely because it happens to be a part of a University in the United Kingdom which admittedly does not exist in India as a University. In our opinion, for exemption under section 10(22) of the Act, the University or the educational institution must exist as a University or an educational institution solely for educational purposes in India. In other words, in our opinion, the recipient of the income must have the character of a University or an educational institution in India. Its character outside India or it being a part of a University existing outside India, in our view, is not relevant for deciding whether its income would be exempt under section 10(22) of the Act.

We are supported in our above conclusion by the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Sorabji Nusserwanji Parekh [1993] 201 ITR 939. In the above case, dealing with the claim of the assessee for exemption under section 10(22) of the Act, it was observed (page 950) :

"....in order to earn total exemption under section 10(22) of the Act, an assessee should be an educational institution or an establishment which primarily engages itself in educational activities. Though the words 'educational activities' are words of very wide amplitude, we would like to add that the element of imparting education to students or the element of normal schooling where there are teachers and taught must be present so as to fall within the sweep of section 10(22) of the Act. We would, at the same time, like to add that such an institution may, incidentally, take other activities for the benefit of students or in furtherance of their education. It may invest its funds in any manner it likes or it may provide scholarships or other financial assistance which may be helpful to the students in pursuing their studies. However, such incidental activities alone, in the absence of actual activity of imparting education by normal schooling or normal conducting of classes, would not be sufficient for the purpose of qualifying the institution to earn the benefit of section 10(22) of the said Act."

It may be expedient at this stage to refer to an unreported decision of this court in the case of the assessee relied upon by learned counsel for the assessee, where for the purpose of exemption under section 32(v)(b) of the Bonus Act, it was held to be a part of the University and hence educational institution. We have carefully perused the same. The ratio of the above decision, in our opinion, cannot be applied in construing section 10(22) of the Act, which deals with exemption of the income of a University or an educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit. In our opinion, clause (22) of the Act has to be construed in the light of the scheme of the Income-tax Act and the object of section 10, in particular clause (22) thereof, and on such a construction, we are of the clear opinion that even if the Oxford University Press is a part of the Oxford University and is being run as such in India, in the absence of the existence of the Oxford University in India, the assessee-press cannot be held to be a University existing for educa tional purposes within the meaning of section 10(22) of the Act and its income cannot be regarded as the income of a University.

Our attention was also drawn by learned counsel for the assessee to section 11 of the Act which grants exemption in respect of income derived from the property held for charitable or religious purposes. It was pointed out that in the said section, the Legislature has specifically provided that the exemption would be restricted only to that part of such, income which is applied to such purposes in India or accumulated or set apart for such purposes. We do not find any relevance of section 11 in construing section 10(22) of the Act. We have nowhere said in the foregoing discussion, how the income of the University should be used in order to get exemption under section 10(22) of the Act. What we have said is that the University or the educational institution itself must exist in India solely for educational purposes and if it so exists, then and then only its income would be exempt under section 10(22) of the Act. If it does not exist as a University or an educational institution solely for such purposes and does not carry on the primary activities of a University or educational institution, but merely runs the business of press in India for printing and publishing books and selling and supplying the same as well as books published by other publishers for the purpose of profit, it cannot be held to be a "University" within the meaning of section 10(22) of the Act merely by reason of the fact that it is run by a University existing outside India for educational purposes or that it is a part of such University.

Moreover, as indicated earlier, the assessee in this case is the Oxford University Press which claims itself to be a part of the Oxford University and claims exemption of its income as income of a University. If the case of the assessee is that in the true sense of the term it is a part and parcel of the Oxford University and has no independent existence of its own, and all its income is the income of the said University, the "assessee" for the purpose of the Income-tax Act would have been the "Oxford University" and not the "Press". The press, as an assessee might have been entitled to claim exemption in respect of its income under section 10(22) of the Act if it could establish that the income is the income of the Oxford University which existed solely for educational purposes. That obviously is not the case of the assessee-press and, according to us, rightly so. In our opinion, the assessee-press was correct in law in offering its income for assessment all throughout in the past and there was no plausible reason to change its consistent stand and to claim exemption under section 10(22) of the Act.

We have also given our careful consideration to the decisions referred to by learned counsel for the assessee. We are, however, of the opinion, that none of those decisions support the claim of the assessee-press for exemption of its income from income-tax under section 10(22) of the Act. The controversy in all those cases was totally different and the ratio of the same has no application to the facts of the present case.

In CIT v. Academy of General Education [1984] 150 ITR 135, the controversy before the Karnataka High Court was whether the Academy of General Education, Manipal, was an educational institution falling under section 10(22) of the Act. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the court held that it was an educational institution existing purely for educational purposes and its income was exempt under section 10(22) of the Act. It was observed (page 139) :

"The academy is a registered society and it carries on organised activities as per the objects set out in the memorandum of association. Its primary object is to establish, support, manage or conduct schools, colleges and such other educational institutions. It has got income of its own. In its balance-sheet the incomes of twenty-two colleges or institutions established under separate trusts have not been included. Nor do we find therein the income of the nine schools which are run directly by the academy. It appears that there was no income in that year from any one of those schools. The academy out of its income has given outright grants to some of those schools. The academy has not spent its income for any purpose unconnected with education. It is, therefore, an educational institution existing purely for educational purposes and not for profit."

Obviously, the ratio of this decision would not be applicable to the facts of the present case.

In Rangaraya Medical College (Governing Body of) v. ITO [1979] 117 ITR 284 (AP), the controversy was whether the assessee-society was a medical college entitled to exemption from income-tax under section 10(22) of the Act. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the court came to the conclusion that the assessee-society, whose sole object was managing and maintaining the medical institution, was an educational institution without any profit motive or personal profit for the purposes of section 10(22) of the Act. The ratio of the above decision cannot be applied to the present case where the object of the assessee-press was not to manage or maintain the Oxford University or any other educational institution.

Equally inapplicable is the ratio of the decision of the Kerala High Court in CIT v. Sree Narayana Chandrika Trust [1995] 212 ITR 456. In that case, the controversy was whether the assessee-trust, whose sole object was the establishment and running, etc., of hospitals, was entitled to exemption under section 10(22A) of the Act. The court decided the controversy in favour of the trust and observed that what is relevant for the purpose of section 10(22A) is that the income should reach the hospital to be applied by it for philanthropic purposes and not for purposes Of profit. It was pointed out (page 468) :

" The stress appears to be on the recipient of the income. If that is the hospital, that is the trust running it, section 10(22A) must apply. "

The above observations do not in any way assist the assessee because the assessee-press is neither a University nor an educational institution.

So far as the decision of the Orissa High Court in Secondary Board of Education v. ITO [1972] 86 ITR 408 and of the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat State Co-operative Union v. CIT [1992] 195 ITR 279 are concerned, with utmost respect, we find it difficult to accept the same. In the Orissa case, the Board of Secondary Education established under the Orissa Secondary Education Act, 1953, was held to be an educational institution falling under section 10(22) of the Act. In the Gujarat case, the Gujarat State Co-operative Union was held to be an educational institution for the purposes of section 10(22) of the Act. In our opinion, the law in this regard is well-settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust v. CIT [1975] 101 ITR 234, where it was held that the word " education" connotes the process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind and character of students by normal schooling and has not been used in the wide and extensive sense according to which every acquisition of further knowledge constitutes education. The above decisions of the Orissa and the Gujarat High Court, in our opinion, go counter to the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Loka Shikshana Trust's case [1975] 101 ITR 234.

In view of the above, we answer the question referred to us in the negative and in favour of the Revenue.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

 

 

 

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